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 Restoring Internet Freedom as an 
Example of How to Regulate 
Jerry Ellig* 
ABSTRACT 
Thomas Lambert’s How to Regulate urges regulators to diagnose the extent and 
causes of the problems they seek to solve and consider the benefits and costs of 
alternative solutions. It also warns that government officials are affected by the 
incentives and knowledge constraints they face, and regulations should be de-
signed to mitigate this problem. The Federal Communications Commission’s Re-
storing Internet Freedom order provides examples of these principles in practice. 
In its assessment of blocking, throttling, paid prioritization, and other general 
business conduct of broadband providers, the order first utilized economic re-
search to identify the extent and causes of the underlying problems the FCC 
sought to solve, then selected alternative solutions tailored to address the prob-
lems. In deciding whether to classify broadband as a Title I information service or 
a Title II telecommunications service, the FCC took note of regulators’ incentives 
under Title II to extend regulation to include regulation of prices, unbundling 
requirements, and other types of regulation that the FCC had imposed on tele-
communications carriers in the past. Reclassifying broadband under Title I re-
duced the risk of expanded regulation that would expropriate broadband firms’ 
sunk investments.    
                                                          
* Research Professor, Regulatory Studies Center, George Washington University. Ph.D., economics, 
George Mason University, 1988; M.A., economics, George Mason University, 1986; B.A., economics, 
Xavier University, 1984. The author served as chief economist at the Federal Communications Com-
mission from July 2017-July 2018. The author would like to thank Bridget Dooling, Susan Dudley, and 
Mark Febrezio for helpful comments on earlier drafts, but the views expressed in this Article are solely 
those of the author. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Lambert’s book, How to Regulate,1 is a highly readable and cogent 
guide to fundamental principles of regulatory analysis. Key principles include (1) 
diagnosing the extent and cause of the problem regulators seek to solve, (2) identi-
fying alternative solutions, and (3) comparing the benefits and costs of the alterna-
tives.2 As Lambert notes, on the federal level, these principles are enshrined in the 
executive orders that govern regulatory analysis in executive branch agencies.3 
Some independent agencies have adopted the same or similar principles to guide 
their regulatory analysis.4 
Lambert also suggests an important principle that gets less attention from 
regulatory agencies: “[G]overnment officials do not shed their self-interested na-
ture when they step into the public square.”5 Public choice, a research program in 
economics and political science, explains how public officials’ decisions are af-
fected by the incentives and knowledge constraints created by the government 
institutions within which they function.6 The fact that government officials, like 
private citizens, can be expected to respond to the incentives and constraints they 
face may create adverse consequences that should be taken into account when 
choosing whether or how to regulate. 
This article presents a practical application of these principles in action by de-
scribing the economic analysis in the Federal Communications Commission’s 
(“FCC”) 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom order.7 The FCC’s decision to repeal 
and replace the net neutrality rules adopted in 2015 is largely consistent with 
Lambert’s own recommendations on net neutrality.8 As one might expect, howev-
er, the FCC’s order offers a much more extensive explanation based on the public 
record in the proceeding and relevant economic literature.9 
The 2015 Open Internet order prohibited Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) 
from blocking or throttling content, or offering content providers paid prioritiza-
tion of their traffic.10 An ISP blocks content when it prevents the content from 
                                                          
 1. THOMAS LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS (2017). 
 2. Id. at 14–15. 
 3. Id. at 252. 
 4. See, e.g., SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF RISK, STRATEGY, & FIN. INNOVATION, AND 
OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM: CURRENT GUIDANCE ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN SEC 
RULEMAKINGS 1–2 (2012). 
 5. Lambert, supra note 1, at 33. 
 6. See generally James M. Buchanan, Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research 
Program, PUBLIC CHOICE SOCIETY (2003), 
https://publicchoicesociety.org/content/general/PublicChoiceBooklet.pdf; Gordon Tullock, Public 
Choice, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 5234-39 (Stephen N. Durlauf 
& Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008)(These sources provide nontechnical explanations of public choice 
by two of its founders). 
 7. In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (F.C.C. January 4, 2018) [herein-
after Restoring Internet Freedom]. This Article refers to the order as the “2017 order” because it was 
adopted at the December 2017 commission meeting. 
 8. See Lambert, supra note 1, at 175–83. 
 9. See generally Jerry Ellig et al., Economics at the FCC, 2017–2018: Internet Freedom, Interna-
tional Broadband Pricing Comparisons, and a New Office of Economics and Analytics, 53 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 681 (2018) (This Article draws heavily on work from that previous article. However, any 
statements or conclusions that go beyond what is contained in that article are solely the author’s). 
 10. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5607 (F.C.C. Mar. 12, 2015) 
[hereinafter Open Internet Order]. 
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reaching subscribers; it throttles content when it deliberately slows or otherwise 
degrades the quality of transmission.11 The order also imposed a “general conduct 
rule” that prohibited any business practices that would create “unreasonable inter-
ference or disadvantage.”12 A prior court decision said that imposition of these 
rules amounted to common carrier regulation, which the FCC lacked legal authori-
ty to impose so long as broadband was classified as an information service under 
Title I of the Communications Act.13 To ensure that it had legal authority to im-
pose these rules, the FCC reclassified broadband as a telecommunications service 
under Title II of the Communications Act.14 This reclassification made broadband 
eligible for the full panoply of common carrier regulations, including regulation of 
entry, prices, network unbundling, interconnection, discontinuance of service, and 
quality of service.15 In the 2015 order, the FCC forbore from imposing these other 
types of common carrier regulations and associated recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements.16 
The 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom order removed the prohibitions on 
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.17 It also repealed the general conduct 
rule.18 ISPs were required to disclose whether they engage in any blocking, throt-
tling, or paid prioritization.19 Broadband was reclassified as a Title I information 
service, making it ineligible for common carrier regulation.20 
The 2017 order’s decisions on blocking and throttling, paid prioritization, and 
the general conduct rule are informed by an extensive diagnosis of the problems 
the regulations are intended to solve and an assessment of the merits of alternative 
solutions. The decision to reclassify broadband from Title II to Title I takes into 
account the public choice incentives that could lead regulators to behave in a less-
than-optimal way. 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows: Part II demonstrates how the 
FCC’s analysis of blocking and throttling assessed the extent and cause of the 
problem and evaluated alternative solutions. The FCC concluded that broadband 
providers often have financial incentives to avoid blocking and throttling, and 
when they do not, a combination of disclosure, consumer protection, and antitrust 
regulation was more carefully tailored to prevent blocking and throttling when 
they harm consumers. Part III shows why the FCC decided that “rule of reason” 
antitrust enforcement would be superior to an outright ban: the published main-
stream economics literature showed that paid prioritization could either advance 
or harm consumer welfare depending on the specific facts and circumstances. Part 
IV explains why the FCC decided that the general conduct standard was vague 
and was likely to deter pro-consumer innovation. The FCC determined that, be-
cause they are guided by an established body of precedent, the general antitrust 
and consumer protection laws would do a better job of deterring as-yet-
                                                          
 11. Shane Greenstein et al., Net Neutrality: A Fast Lane to Understanding the Trade-Offs, 30 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 127, 128 (2016), http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.30.2.127. 
 12. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 5661. 
 13. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 14. Open Internet Order, supra note 10, at 134–35. 
 15. Id. at 214–54. 
 16. Id. at 217–19. 
 17. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 147–60. 
 18. Id. at 142–47. 
 19. Id. at 217–18. 
 20. Id. at 4. 
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unimagined, anti-consumer business practices while leaving broadband firms 
greater freedom to innovate. Part V shows how the reclassification of broadband 
from Title II to Title I was explicitly intended to reduce the risk created by regula-
tors’ public choice incentive to expropriate broadband providers’ sunk invest-
ments. Part VI concludes. 
II. BLOCKING AND THROTTLING 
The published economics literature assessing whether blocking can harm con-
sumers consists of theoretical modeling. The preponderant result from these mod-
els is that blocking the content that consumers want to access diminishes consum-
er welfare.21 One paper that examines the blocking of content that competes with 
the ISP’s own services finds that prohibiting this blocking can either increase or 
decrease consumer welfare, depending on the circumstances.22 
Throttling has been less explicitly examined in the economics literature. If 
throttling is severe enough that it makes an application or content unusable, then 
logically it is tantamount to blocking. Thus, there is a possibility of consumer 
harm if ISPs choose to block or throttle. But to demonstrate that a significant sys-
temic problem exists that regulation might solve, one must determine whether 
ISPs are likely to block or throttle. 
It is clear that openness (i.e., the absence of blocking or throttling) is im-
portant to many stakeholders, including ISPs’ subscribers.23 If ISPs face competi-
tion, one that blocks or throttles runs the risk of losing subscribers to competing 
ISPs.24 As a result, the Restoring Internet Freedom order examined the extent of 
competition in broadband to determine whether it is strong enough to constrain 
blocking or throttling that would harm consumers.25 
Broadband competition does not meet the economics textbook ideal of “per-
fect competition.”26 However, the data show that many ISPs face noticeable com-
petitive constraints. Table 1 shows the percentage of the U.S. population living in 
census blocks with various numbers of residential wireline broadband ISPs as of 
December 2016. A majority of Americans live in census blocks with two or more 
wireline ISPs offering service of at least 25 megabits per second (“Mbps”) down-
load and 3 Mbps upload. Two-thirds live in census blocks with two or more wire-
line competitors offering service of at least 10 Mbps download and 1 Mbps up-
load. 
                                                          
 21. Mark A. Jamison et al., Economic Scholars’ Summary of Economic Literature Regarding Title II 
Regulation of the Internet 8 (July 15, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/107150597330219. 
 22. Sébastien Broos & Axel Gautier, The Exclusion of Competing One-Way Essential Complements: 
Implications for Net Neutrality, 52 INT’L. J. INDUS. ORG. 358, 361 (2017). 
 23. “Stakeholders from across the Internet ecosystem oppose the blocking and throttling of lawful 
content, including ISPs, public interest groups, edge providers, other content producers, network 
equipment manufacturers, government entities, and other businesses and individuals who use the 
Internet.” Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 468 (footnotes omitted); see also Maureen K. 
Ohlhausen,  Comment Letter on FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Restoring Internet Freedom 
9 (July 17, 2017). 
 24. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Antitrust over Net Neutrality: Why We Should Take Competition in 
Broadband Seriously. 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 119, 146–47 (2016). 
 25. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 383–94. 
 26. Id. at 385 n.464. 
4
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 3 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol3/iss2/5
240 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 3 2019 
Table 1: Percent of US population in developed census 
blocks with fixed residential broadband ISPs as of De-
cember 31, 2016 
______________________________________________________________ 
   Number of providers 
Speed of at least   3+ 2 1 0 
     
3 Mbps down and 0.768 Mbps up 12.1% 67.2% 16.2% 4.4% 
10 Mbps down and 1 Mbps up  9.0% 58.5% 26.3% 6.2% 
25 Mbps down and 3 Mbps up  5.9% 45.2% 39.6% 9.2% 
______________________________________________________________ 
Source: Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7 at 73. 
 
Two wireline ISPs are likely to create significant competitive pressure. Since 
most of an ISP’s investment is sunk and the marginal cost of adding an additional 
customer is low, as few as two ISPs face strong incentives to compete vigorous-
ly.27 This inference is consistent with empirical research showing that the addition 
of a second competitor has the largest impact on prices,28 and the addition of a 
fourth broadband competitor has negligible impact.29 
Broadband ISPs also face competitive constraints from entities other than 
wireline ISPs. Table 2 shows the percentage of the U.S. population living in de-
veloped census blocks with various numbers of fixed broadband ISPs. Fixed ISPs 
include wireline ISPs as well as fixed satellite and fixed wireless. Including these 
competitors, virtually all Americans live in census blocks served by two competi-
tors offering service at a speed of at least 10 Mbps download and 1 Mbps upload, 
and more than 90% live in census blocks with three competitors. Three-quarters of 
Americans live in census blocks with at least two competitors offering speeds of 
25 Mbps download and 3 Mbps upload. 
                                                          
 27. See Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, MODERN INDUS. ORG. 59–60 (4th ed. 2005); Jona-
than E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: TELECOMM. LAW AND POL’Y IN THE 
INTERNET AGE 8–10 (2nd ed. 2013); Jerry Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications Regula-
tion: Current 
Approaches with the End in Sight, ECON. REG. AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 345, 
353–54 (Nancy L. Rose ed. 2005); Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., THE DEV. OF FIXED 




 28. Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for U.S. 
Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. REG. 55, 91 (2007); Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, 
Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets, 99 J. POL. ECON. 977, 1006 (1991); Allan Collard-
Wexler, Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry, 81 ECONOMETRICA 1003, 1008 
(2013); Paul A. Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 119, 200–01 
(2003). 
 29. See generally Mo Xiao & Peter F. Orazem, Does the Fourth Entrant Make Any Difference? 
Entry and Competition in the Early U.S. Broadband Market, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 547 (2011). 
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Table 2: Percent of US population in developed census 
blocks with fixed residential broadband ISPs as of De-
cember 31, 2016 
______________________________________________________________ 
   Number of providers 
Speed of at least   3+ 2 1 0 
     
3 Mbps down and 0.768 Mbps up 97.0% 2.8% 0.1% 0.1% 
10 Mbps down and 1 Mbps up  93.6% 5.7% 0.6% 0.1% 
25 Mbps down and 3 Mbps up  43.9% 32.6% 19.1% 4.4% 
______________________________________________________________ 
Source: Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7 at 73. 
 
Fixed broadband does not exhaust the competitive possibilities. As of 2017, 
four wireless broadband carriers offering speeds of 3G or better covered 92% of 
the U.S. population, including 69% of rural areas.30 One in five households use 
only mobile broadband at home, including 15% of households with incomes ex-
ceeding $100,000 annually.31 The 2017 order also notes that “[w]ith the advent of 
5G technologies promising sharply increased mobile speeds in the near future, the 
pressure mobile exerts in the broadband marketplace will become even more sig-
nificant.”32 
As an alternative to regulatory prohibitions, the FCC considered whether 
mandatory disclosure, consumer protection laws, and antitrust laws can prevent 
blocking or throttling that harms consumers.33 
A key prerequisite for effective consumer choice is consumer knowledge of 
whether an ISP engages in blocking or throttling. Some ISPs have voluntarily 
declared that they do not block or throttle—either due to competitive pressures or 
fear of public shaming.34 Others have not. To ensure that consumers know wheth-
er their ISPs block or throttle, the FCC retained a rule that requires ISPs to dis-
close blocking, throttling, paid prioritization, and other business practices.35 If an 
ISP claims that it does not block or throttle but then does so anyway, it can be 
prosecuted for failing to obey the disclosure rule as well as for conducting unfair 
or deceptive business practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act.36 If an 
ISP acknowledges that it blocks or throttles, it could be liable under the antitrust 
laws if the blocking or throttling produces consumer harm with no offsetting con-
sumer benefits.37 
It is instructive to note that the two most significant cases of alleged blocking 
or throttling discussed in the 2015 Open Internet order could arguably have been 
                                                          
 30. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 387. 
 31. Id. at 75. 
 32. Id. at 75–76. 
 33. Id. at 72–73. 
 34. Id. at 87–92. 
 35. Id. at 125–35. 
 36. Ohlhausen, supra note 23, at 128. 
 37. “The rule of reason adopts an all-encompassing inquiry, paying close attention to the consumer 
benefits and downsides of the challenged practice based on the facts at hand. If that inquiry shows that 
a particular act of paid prioritization, throttling, or blocking enhanced consumer welfare, then that 
should be the end of the matter from a competition standpoint.” Ohlhausen, supra note 24, at 142. 
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prosecuted as antitrust or consumer protection cases. Madison River involved a 
local phone company that provided Digital Subscriber Line (“DSL”) service but 
blocked ports used by Voice over Internet Protocol (“VOIP”) applications, thus 
preventing VOIP providers from competing with its telephony business.38 Com-
cast’s throttling of BitTorrent streams could have been pursued as a consumer 
protection case, because Comcast failed to disclose the throttling and initially 
refused to characterize it as such.39 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) re-
quires businesses to disclose material information to consumers if failure to do so 
would mislead consumers, and failure to provide the product or service the con-
sumer purchased is considered an unfair or deceptive trade practice.40 Since Bit-
Torrent enabled users to view video they would otherwise have had to purchase 
through Comcast’s On Demand service, an anticompetitive foreclosure claim may 
also have been possible.41 
Use of the antitrust and consumer protection laws to thwart anti-consumer 
blocking or throttling is not just a theoretical possibility. In 2015, the FTC suc-
cessfully prosecuted TracFone for claiming that its plans provide unlimited data, 
only to later throttle customers who used 1–3 gigabytes (“GB”) of data a month 
and cut off customers who used 4–5 GB a month.42 
The FCC concluded that the potential harm to consumers from blocking and 
throttling is real. However, the FCC’s diagnosis of the problem found that the 
likelihood that broadband providers will engage in blocking or throttling is sub-
stantially mitigated because consumers value openness and broadband ISPs often 
face significant competition. Mandatory disclosure of blocking or throttling would 
facilitate consumer choice and enforcement of the consumer protection and anti-
trust laws, which prohibit false, misleading, or anticompetitive business practices. 
III. PAID PRIORITIZATION 
No ISP has implemented paid prioritization. Therefore, all the economics lit-
erature evaluating the consumer welfare effects of paid prioritization consists of 
theoretical models. This economics literature shows unambiguously that under 
some plausible conditions, paid prioritization could harm consumers, and under 
other plausible conditions, paid prioritization could benefit consumers.43 A zero 
price for edge providers is the efficient price only under special conditions.44 
                                                          
 38. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 66. 
 39. Id. at 88. 
 40. Ohlhausen, supra note 23, at 84, n.501. (“The practices that concern advocates of net neutrality 
regulation involve consumer protection issues. For example, much of the concern about Comcast’s 
alleged treatment of certain BitTorrent streams was that it was not apparent to consumers, and there-
fore Comcast allegedly deceived consumers about the service they purchased.”). 
 41. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 88. 
 42. Id. at 84, n.501. 
 43. Jameson et al, supra note 21, at 361–365. 
 44. See generally Mark Bykowsky and William W. Sharkey, Welfare Effects of Paid for Prioritiza-
tion Services: A Matching Model with Non-Uniform Quality of Service (2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468202. The Restoring Internet Freedom order 
notes, “The Title II Order cited three papers by [former FCC chief] economist Michael Katz to support 
its conclusions about paid prioritization—fully half of the economic literature cited in favor of the ban. 
See Title Order II, 30 FCC Rcd at 5655, para. 126 & nn.296–97. In response, Katz has written that his 
papers simply “do not” support the conclusions of the Title II Order. Katz, Wither U.S. Net Neutrality 
Regulation? at 459. See also Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Product-
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When competition exists among ISPs, the possibility that paid prioritization could 
harm consumers is less likely.45 The 2017 order’s competition analysis (described 
above) found that broadband ISPs face material competitive constraints. 
There are two possible reasons market power raises concerns about allowing 
ISPs to charge content providers as well as subscribers. First, an ISP could theo-
retically have a large enough market share that it could charge the content provid-
er a supracompetitive price.46 Second, an ISP of any size might possess a “termi-
nating access monopoly”—that is, a monopoly over access to its subscribers.47 
Consider each in turn. 
A. ISP with Large Market Share 
In theory, an ISP with a very large market share of subscribers could charge 
edge providers a supracompetitive price to access subscribers.48 Therefore, the 
FCC examined competition in the market for access to subscribers.49 The largest 
wireline broadband ISP, Comcast, serves approximately one-quarter of subscrib-
ers in the US.50 Even if Comcast was willing and able to extract a supracompeti-
tive price from an edge provider, that provider could still access the remaining 
three-quarters of the market via ISPs with smaller market shares and less ability to 
influence prices.51 The larger edge providers, such as Netflix, Google, and Ama-
zon, have significant bargaining leverage of their own.52 
Indeed, it is not even clear whether an ISP that possesses some power over 
prices to edge providers would choose to charge a supracompetitive price. The 
value of the ISP’s platform to subscribers increases when subscribers can access 
more content, so even an ISP with market power over edge providers has a coun-
tervailing incentive to keep prices to edge providers competitive in order to offer 
more content that will attract subscribers.53 
B. Terminating Access Monopoly 
A conceptually separate question is whether any ISP, regardless of size, could 
charge edge providers a supracompetitive price because it has a monopoly over 
access to its particular subscribers.54 Telecommunications economists call this 
phenomenon “terminating access monopoly.”55 Terminating access monopoly is 
                                                          
Line Restrictions with an Application to the Network Neutrality Debate, 19 INFO. ECON. & POL. 215, 
48 (2007) (demonstrating that regulations that require a platform owner to provide a single quality of 
service can reduce economic welfare).” Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 150 fn. 927. 
 45. Viktória Kocsis & Paul Bijl, Network Neutrality and the Nature of Competition Between Net-
work Operators, 4 INT’L ECON. & ECON. POL’Y 159, 180–181 (2007); Bykowsky & Sharkey, supra 
note 44, at 6. 
 46. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 78–80. 
 47. Id. at 80–82. 
 48. Greenstein et al., supra note 11 at 135, 137–39. 
 49. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 78. 
 50. Id. at 79. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 80. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Jerry Ellig, Intercarrier Compensation and Consumer Welfare, 2005 J. LAW, TECH., & POL’Y 
97, 103 (2005). 
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the primary economic justification for regulation cited in the 2015 Open Internet 
order.56 
However, if subscribers use more than one broadband platform—such as one 
fixed and one mobile, as many do—then there is no terminating access monopo-
ly.57 Many subscribers use both fixed and mobile broadband connections at home, 
and they have access to additional platforms at work and various Wi-fi connec-
tions at restaurants and shops.58 Thus, in many (if not most) cases, edge providers 
have multiple platforms by which they can reach the same subscriber. 
Even if some ISPs have market power over some edge providers due to a 
terminating access monopoly over some portion of their subscribers, that does not 
necessarily mean that allowing ISPs to charge edge providers will diminish over-
all economic welfare. Since ISPs compete for subscribers, supracompetitive prof-
its earned from edge providers will likely be dissipated by competing for sub-
scribers—offering subscribers lower prices or quality improvements.59 
Given these findings, a complete ban on paid prioritization (i.e., a zero price 
for edge providers) is very unlikely to be the efficient rule. Therefore, the FCC 
considered antitrust as an alternative means of preventing forms of paid prioritiza-
tion that harm consumers.60 
Under some circumstances, paid prioritization could run afoul of antitrust 
laws. For example, “a paid prioritization agreement offered to one edge provider 
but not others could be challenged as exclusionary.”61 Similarly, offering an affili-
ated edge provider more favorable terms than a non-affiliated edge provider could 
be challenged as anticompetitive.62 
If challenged under the antitrust laws, a paid prioritization arrangement would 
most likely be evaluated under the antitrust “rule of reason.”63 Under the rule of 
reason, a paid prioritization agreement may be found to be anticompetitive if (1) 
the ISP has substantial market power, (2) the agreement excludes the edge provid-
er’s competitors, and (3) the anticompetitive harm exceeds any improvement in 
economic efficiency or consumer welfare.64 Essentially, the rule of reason 
amounts to a welfare test. There is some disagreement as to whether the focus is 
overall economic welfare (economic efficiency) or consumer welfare, but it is 
clearly a welfare evaluation using the tools of economics.65 This is precisely the 
test one would want in order to distinguish paid prioritization arrangements which 
result in net positive effects from those which result in net negative effects. It is 
thus tailor-made to deal with business practices whose effects on economic wel-
fare, as demonstrated by the published academic literature, vary depending on the 
specific facts and circumstances of the situation. 
As with blocking and throttling, the FCC chose in its 2017 order to require 
that ISPs disclose any paid prioritization arrangements and any practices that fa-
                                                          
 56. Open Internet Order, supra note 10, at 33. 
 57. Ellig et al., supra note 9, at 687. 
 58. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 79. 
 59. Id. at 81–82. 
 60. Id. at 87–93. 
 61. Id. at 156 n.957 (citing FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY AND 
COMPETITION POLICY 127 (2007)). 
 62. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 88. 
 63. Id. at 87. 
 64. Ohlhausen, supra note 24, at 136. 
 65. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 87, n. 519. 
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vor affiliated traffic over non-affiliated traffic.66 Disclosure was explicitly justified 
both as a way to assist consumers in making informed choices and to discourage 
anticompetitive, unfair, or deceptive conduct.67 
The FCC’s assessment of paid prioritization demonstrates how economic rea-
soning can more carefully identify the nature of a problem and aid in selection of 
an appropriately tailored solution. Economic research clearly demonstrates that 
paid prioritization can either benefit or harm consumers under plausible circum-
stances. For that reason, an outright ban cannot be the policy that best promotes 
consumer welfare. Antitrust’s rule of reason, which assesses whether business 
conduct is anticompetitive in light of specific facts and circumstances, is much 
better designed to assess this type of business practice. 
IV. GENERAL CONDUCT 
Under the general conduct rule adopted in 2015, the FCC claimed authority to 
investigate and prohibit unspecified business practices that might arise in the fu-
ture.68 The 2015 order provided a non-exhaustive list of factors the FCC would 
consider in evaluating a challenged practice, including whether the practice per-
mitted end-user control; effects on firms offering services that compete with the 
ISP; whether the practice is unfair or deceptive; the effect on innovation, invest-
ment, and broadband deployment; the effect on free expression; whether the prac-
tice is application agnostic; and whether the practice is consistent with best prac-
tices or technological standards from open, broadly representative, and independ-
ent Internet engineering or standards organizations.69 The only business practice 
ever investigated under this standard was mobile carriers’ practice of “zero rat-
ing,” which allowed subscribers to receive certain types of content without having 
it count against their monthly data allowance.70 In some cases, the subscriber 
agreed to receive the content at a lower resolution that used less bandwidth; in 
other cases, the content was sponsored via payment by the sender.71 In effect, 
“[c]arriers found themselves under investigation for offering consumers a lower-
cost option.”72 
In its 2017 order, the FCC compared the likely effects of the general conduct 
rule to the effects of using the antitrust and consumer protection laws to police 
new anti-consumer business practices.73 It found that the general conduct standard 
is vague and likely deters pro-consumer innovation because ISPs cannot tell in 
advance what practices are permitted or prohibited: “[t]he rule simply warns carri-
                                                          
 66. Id. at 128–32. 
 67. “What is more, disclosure increases the likelihood that ISPs will abide by open Internet princi-
ples by reducing the incentives and ability to violate those principles, that the Internet community will 
identify problematic conduct, and that those affected by such conduct will be in a position to make 
informed competitive choices or seek available remedies for anticompetitive, unfair, or deceptive 
practices.” Id. at 129 (footnotes omitted). 
 68. Open Internet Order, supra note 10, at 59–60. 
 69. Id. at 61–64. 
 70. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 145. 
 71. Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Policy Review of Mobile Broadband Operators’ Spon-
sored Data Offerings for Zero-Rated Content and Services, FCC at 2–3 (2017), 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0111/DOC-342987A1.pdf. 
 72. Ellig et al., supra note 9, at 689. 
 73. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 143–44. 
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ers to behave in accordance with what the Commission might require, without 
articulating any actual standard. Even ISP practices based on consumer choice are 
not presumptively permitted; they are merely ‘less likely’ to violate the rule.”74 On 
the other hand, the antitrust and consumer protection laws are flexible enough to 
address new business practices but are also guided by a body of precedent that 
makes it easier for firms to predict what practices would be permitted.75 The FCC 
also preferred the antitrust/consumer protection approach because enforcement 
decisions are grounded in welfare economics rather than a “non-exhaustive grab 
bag of considerations that are much broader and hazier than the consumer welfare 
standard.”76 
The Restoring Internet Freedom order takes seriously the possibility that 
broadband providers could invent new anti-consumer business practices in the 
future. But it also recognizes that requiring ISPs to seek permission to innovate 
could chill innovation. Given these competing possibilities, the FCC decided that 
the antitrust and consumer protection laws could adequately protect consumers, 
while their established precedents could give ISPs adequate guidance as to what 
kinds of conduct would be prohibited. 
V. RECLASSIFICATION 
In reclassifying broadband as a Title I information service instead of a Title II 
common carrier, the FCC explicitly considered the public choice incentives that 
can affect regulators’ behavior when they implement Title II regulation. Broad-
band shares an important characteristic with other types of infrastructure that are 
often subjected to public utility regulation: a broadband network requires a large, 
irreversible investment that is “sunk”—that is, the investment has no good alterna-
tive use. After the investment is made, regulators have an incentive to apply addi-
tional price or other regulations that expropriate part of the investment to benefit 
some favored class of customers.77 To elicit the optimal amount of investment, 
regulators need to offer a credible commitment that they will not expropriate the 
investment.78 If regulators cannot make a credible commitment, investment will 
fall below the optimal level due to the increased risk of expropriation.79 
The FCC’s reclassification of broadband under Title II in 2015 made broad-
band potentially eligible for regulation of prices, unbundling requirements, and 
other types of regulation that the FCC had imposed on telecommunications carri-
ers in the past. At the time, the FCC stated that it was forbearing from these types 
of common carrier regulation for broadband.80 The 2017 order suggests that this 
commitment may not be credible.81 The 2015 order did not forbear from ex post 
regulation of charges to subscribers.82 In addition, although the 2015 order 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 143. 
 75. Id. at 144. 
 76. Id. at 144. 
 77. Graeme Guthrie, Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 
925, 950–51 (2006). 
 78. Id. at 949. 
 79. Id. at 950–51. 
 80. Open Internet Order, supra note 10, at 215. 
 81. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 60. 
 82. Id. 
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claimed to forbear from ex ante price regulation, it effectively imposed a price of 
zero on charges to content providers by banning paid prioritization.83 
Whether the Open Internet order decreased broadband investment by increas-
ing regulatory risk is ultimately an empirical question. Consequently, the FCC 
examined relevant empirical evidence. 
The Restoring Internet Freedom order notes that broadband investment fell 
slightly in 2015 and 2016, including a careful discussion of various analysts’ es-
timates.84 It also correctly emphasized that this before-and-after comparison “can 
only be regarded as suggestive” because eyeballing a few years’ worth of data 
does not control for other factors that could affect broadband investment, such as 
the overall state of the economy, technological change, and the fact that it takes 
time for companies to alter their capital expenditure plans.85 A more reliable anal-
ysis would compare observed outcomes to a relevant counterfactual that assesses 
what would have likely happened in the absence of Title II regulation.86 Because 
there were insufficient empirical data to conduct a controlled study of the effects 
of the 2015 order, the FCC examined economic studies that assessed the effects of 
similar policies in other time periods.87 
One study, by George Ford, was submitted to the FCC as a working paper 
and was later published in the peer-reviewed journal Applied Economics.88 Ford 
used a difference-in-difference event study methodology to determine whether 
there was any correlation between broadband investment and FCC Chairman 
Genachowski’s 2010 announcement that Title II regulation was a possibility.89 
Ford’s measure of investment was the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ data series 
on broadcasting and telecommunications investment.90 His study assessed whether 
investment by this industry segment deviated significantly from investment by a 
control group of several other industries with which it was highly correlated be-
fore 2010.91 Ford found that broadcasting and telecommunications investment did 
indeed deviate from investment by the control group after 2010.92 He estimated 
that annual broadcasting and telecommunications investment was reduced by 
approximately $30–40 billion after Title II regulation became a possibility.93 The 
FCC noted that because the measure of investment Ford used includes more than 
just broadband investment, Ford’s estimate may overstate the size of the effect on 
broadband investment.94 
                                                          
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 56. 
 85. Id. at 56. 
 86. Id. at 57. 
 87. Id. at 56–58. 
 88. George S. Ford, Net Neutrality, Reclassification and Investment: A Counterfactual Analysis, 
PHOENIX CTR. 
PERSPECTIVES (2017), http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective17-02Final.pdf; George 
S. Ford, Reg. and Inv. in the U.S. Telecomm. Industry, 50 APPLIED ECON. 6073 (2018). 
 89. See George S. Ford, Reg. and Inv. in the U.S. Telecomm. Industry, 50 APPLIED ECON. 6073 
(2018). 
 90. Id. at 6075. 
 91. Id. at 6077. 
 92. Id. at 6078. 
 93. Id. at 6080. 
 94. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 57. 
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Another empirical study was conducted by Thomas Hazlett and Joshua 
Wright and published in the Review of Industrial Organization.95 They examined 
subscribership growth for DSL versus cable modems after the FCC lifted Title II 
line-sharing regulations in 2003 and then reclassified DSL broadband as a Title I 
information service in 2005. At that time, phone companies still had to make sub-
stantial investments to make copper phone lines capable of carrying the DSL sig-
nal, so any substantial increase in subscribership required an increase in invest-
ment. Hazlett and Wright found that DSL subscribership grew at a much higher 
rate than its past trend following both regulatory changes.96 DSL subscribership 
also grew at a much faster rate than cable modem subscribership after these 
changes.97 These results imply that phone companies became more willing to 
invest in their DSL networks when Title II regulations were lifted.98 Thus, the 
empirical studies that did the best job of comparing observed outcomes to a rele-
vant counterfactual suggest that Title II regulation depresses investment by in-
creasing risk.99 
The FCC’s analysis of reclassification clearly recognized that regulators 
could have incentives to expropriate ISPs’ sunk investments through price or open 
access regulation—a clear application of public choice logic. The Restoring Inter-
net Freedom order reduces this risk by reclassifying broadband under Title I, mak-
ing it ineligible for these forms of regulation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
How to Regulate contains some simple but critical pieces of advice for regu-
lators: (1) diagnose the problem before settling on a solution, (2) compare the 
merits (benefits and costs) of alternatives, and (3) recognize that regulators, like 
the rest of us, respond to the incentives created by the organization in which they 
are embedded. The FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom order presents examples of 
how to apply those principles in practice. Moreover, it demonstrates how to apply 
those principles even when data are not available to conduct a conventional, quan-
tified benefit-cost analysis. 
                                                          
 95. Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of Reg. on Broadband Mkt.: Evaluating the 
Empirical Evidence in the FCC’s 2015 “Open Internet” Order, 50 REV. INDUS. ORG. 487 (2017). 
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 97. Id. at 499–500. 
 98. Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 7, at 56. 
 99. Id. at 60. 
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